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The intention of regulation is to protect the vulnerable.  
However, unintended results of regulation can cause the 
opposite occur.  In its present form, the proposed Volcker 
Rule prohibits proprietary trading and has the potential of 
continuing the liquidity crisis that aided in the degradation 
of the housing market into decreased liquidity in the capital 
markets.  The rule also prohibits the owning, sponsoring, or 
having certain relationships with hedge funds beyond three 
percent by the covered banking entities.  Risk is transferring 
to less regulated financial institutions as new hedge funds 
are opened.  The risk can have a profound impact on the 
retirement community through underfunded pension funds 
searching for absolute returns.  Another unintended result 
of the proposed Volcker Rule is banks conducting business 
in the United States or with United States “residents” will 
be at a competitive disadvantage due to lost revenues and 
the high cost of compliance.  The rule has the potential to 
cause United States companies to be at a competitive 
disadvantage in global markets. 
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INTENDED AND UNINTENDED RESULTS OF THE PROPOSED VOLCKER RULE 
 
ABSTRACT 
The intention of regulation is to protect the vulnerable.  However, unintended results of regulation can 
cause the opposite occur.  In its present form, the proposed Volcker Rule prohibits proprietary trading 
and has the potential of continuing the liquidity crisis that aided in the degradation of the housing 
market into decreased liquidity in the capital markets.  The rule also prohibits the owning, sponsoring, 
or having certain relationships with hedge funds beyond three percent by the covered banking entities.  
Risk is transferring to less regulated financial institutions as new hedge funds are opened.  The risk can 
have a profound impact on the retirement community through underfunded pension funds searching 
for absolute returns.  Another unintended result of the proposed Volcker Rule is banks conducting 
business in the United States or with United States “residents” will be at a competitive disadvantage due 
to lost revenues and the high cost of compliance.  The rule has the potential to cause United States 
companies to be at a competitive disadvantage in global markets. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The unintended results of the proposed Volcker Rule can either partially or completely derail the 
intended results.  In the first section, the prohibited practice of proprietary trading and the allowed 
practice of market making will be discussed.  The proposed rule will have the effect of decreasing 
revenue while simultaneously increasing costs for compliance.  The capacity to compete in the global 
markets for covered banking entities as well as for U.S. businesses will decline. 
Relationships with hedge funds and private equity funds are discussed in the second section.  Risk is 
transferring from the more regulated banking entities to the less regulated asset managers and 
insurance companies.  Herding may cause concern, as well as the transfer of risk will place many, 
including vulnerable retirees, at increased risk.  Pension funds are underfunded and are investing in 
hedge funds for absolute returns. 
 
PROPRIETARY TRADING AND MARKET MAKING 
 
The Volcker Rule 
The proposed Volcker Rule is 298 pages long.  A complete copy of the draft of the rule released by the 
Federal Reserve can be located online.  The rule’s official name is “Prohibitions And Restrictions On 
Proprietary Trading And Certain Interests In, And Relationships With, Hedge Funds And Private Equity 
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Funds” (Federal Reserve, 2011).  It has been named the Volcker Rule after the former Federal Reserve 
Chairman, Paul Volcker (Mehta, 2011).   
The Volcker Rule draft that was released on October 11, 2011 has two main prohibitions.  First, the rule 
“prohibits [federally] insured depository institutions, bank holding companies, and their subsidiaries or 
affiliates (banking entities)from engaging in short-term proprietary trading of any security, derivative, 
and certain other financial instruments for a banking entity’s own account, subject to certain 
exemptions.  Second, it prohibits owning, sponsoring, or having certain relationships with, a hedge fund 
or private equity fund, subject to certain exemptions.” (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, 2011). 
A debate is forming in the public sector regarding the unintended results of the rule.  The draft is open 
for public comment on the Federal Reserve’s web site until January 13, 2012 (Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, 2011).  Whether or not the regulation is finalized, the statutory Volcker Rule 
prohibitions will go into effect on July 21, 2012 (Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, 2011). 
The first purpose of the proposed Volcker Rule is to protect customers from losing their deposits 
through the financial firm’s trading that involves risk for the firm’s own benefit.  This type of trading is 
known as proprietary trading.  The second purpose is to lessen systemic risk within the financial system.   
Proprietary Trading is defined in the Financial Dictionary by Farlex (2011); “Proprietary trading (also 
"prop trading") occurs when a firm trades stocks, bonds, currencies, commodities, their derivatives, or 
other financial instruments, with the firm's own money as opposed to its customers' money, so as to 
make a profit for itself.”   
Market making provides liquidity in the markets and increases market efficiency.  The definition of 
market making by Farlex provides further insight into how difficult it can be to identify the difference 
between proprietary trading and market making.  A market maker is, “a dealer available to trade a 
stated security on its own account at any time at the quoted price. The job of a dealer is to be a market 
maker in order to promote liquidity for a security. When a broker-dealer makes a market, it trades from 
its own inventory, which is easier and less expensive for an investor than looking for other brokerages 
willing to trade. Many exchanges designate a market maker for each of its listed securities to promote 
ease of trade.  Market makers improve the efficiency of markets by quoting both bid and ask prices of 
an asset.”  
Decreased Revenues 
The intended and unintended results of the proposed rule follow Newton’s well-known third law, “For 
every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.”  Integrated into the Volcker Rule, without specific 
comment, are the unintended results of decreasing revenue while simultaneously increasing costs.   
The loss in annual revenues by financial institutions affected by the rule will be substantial.  Patterson 
and Zibel (2011) quote analyst estimates of $2 billion in lost revenue.  The removal of the source of 
revenue is occurring at a time when banks are already under pressure from substantial costs and weak 
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growth.   
Touryalai (2011, Oct 7) provides partial details of revenues at risk.  Goldman Sachs’ has 48 percent 
principal trading revenue at risk, although the Nomura analyst Glenn Schorr is quoted as saying the rule 
will impact 20 percent, which is still a substantial loss of revenue.  Morgan Stanley will also feel the 
effect of the rule with up to 27 percent of its principal trading revenue at risk.   Bank of America has 9 
percent at risk, JPMorgan Chase has 8 percent at risk, and Citigroup has 5 percent at risk.   
Nomura’s analyst, Schorr provides clarity to unintended results of the rule in his following statement, “A 
draconian form of the Volcker Rule will likely have unintended consequences, such as reduced liquidity, 
higher funding costs for U.S. companies, less credit for small businesses, higher trading costs and lower 
investor returns, less ability to transfer risk, and competitive disadvantages for U.S. banks relative to 
foreign banks. We are hopeful regulators are mindful of these risks and doing their best to write fair, yet 
effective, rules.” (Touryalai, 2011 October 7). 
Increased Costs 
Costs will be increased by the Volcker Rule, knocking the revenue and cost equation further out of 
balance during a weak recovery.  Tourlyalai (2011, Oct 12) quotes Frank Keating, president of The 
American Banker Association (ABA): 
“Only in today’s regulatory climate could such a simple idea become so complex, 
generating a rule whose preamble alone is 215 pages, with 381 footnotes to boot. 
How can banks comply with a rule that complicated, and how can regulators 
effectively administer it in a way that doesn’t make it harder for banks to serve their 
customers and further weaken the broader economy? 
It’s clear from the proposal that many important details remain unresolved. More 
questions are asked than answered, with requests for public comment on 394 
specific issues. The exceedingly high number of unanswered questions betrays the 
frustration regulators are having as they come to grips with the complexity of the 
concepts behind the Volcker Rule when applied to reality. Regulators will be 
working on these practical questions for a long time to come…Regulators’ own 
estimates indicate banks will have to spend nearly 6.6 million hours to implement 
the rule, of which more than 1.8 million hours would be required every year in 
perpetuity. That translates into 3,292 years, or more than 3,000 bank employees 
whose sole job will be complying with this rule. They will be transferred to a role 
that provides no customer service, generates zero revenue and does nothing for the 
economy.” 
The government estimates that the cost for compliance and capital to banking entities covered by the 
rule will only reach $1 billion.  However, the office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) estimates 
the cost of capital alone will reach $917 million (Brush, 2011).   
Many consider these estimates to be low.  Donald Lamson who once worked for the OCC as assistant 
director and is now a Washington-based counsel at Shearman & Sterling also believes the government’s 
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calculation is too low.  Lamson emphasized the miscalculation of the cost associated with the rule by 
stating, “There are a number of costs associated with this and I think the rulemaking and official 
government assessments understate the costs,” (Brush, 2011).   
Schorr estimates the cost to the industry for compliance and monitoring will reach $2.1 billion each year 
(Mehta, 2011).  After adding this cost to the $2 billion in lost revenues and before considering the 
impact of increased capital requirements, the annual impact of the rule is estimated at $4.1 billion – 
during a weak economy. 
When the proposed application of the rule is reviewed, the reason for the higher estimates for the cost 
of compliance is clear.  Regulatory agencies suggest using 17 metrics in the process for determining if a 
bank has engaged in market making or in the prohibited practice of proprietary trading (Mehta, 2011, 
Oct 16).  Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP Law Firm (Davis, Polk & Wardwell, 2011) created a series of 
flowcharts to explain the Volcker rule.  The flowchart that demonstrates the complex metrics used to 
determine the difference between market making and proprietary trading can be found in Appendix A.   
Mehta (2011) writes in her article about the additional costs that will be incurred by the need to hire 
new compliance employees.  Daily calculations running the 17 metrics will be required of firms with 
more than $5 billion in trading assets and liabilities.  The results are to be reported to regulators 
monthly.  Thirteen firms fall into this category and account for 98.4 percent of the trading assets and 
liabilities of the 1,020 bank holding companies that are to be regulated by the rule.  One compliance 
person will be required in each subsidiary and trading unit to meet the required monitoring for the rule.  
Each bank may have a multiple of a dozen trading units.  To comply with the rule, a multiple of a dozen 
additional jobs in the compliance division would be required. 
Middle sized banks will be required to measure eight of the seventeen metrics, and the small sized 
banks will be exempt.  The smaller scale would make the costs prohibitive for the added monitoring. 
The result of the required monitoring is to add jobs that will add to costs without generating any 
revenue.  The added costs, estimated at $2 billion, will be incurred at a time when banks are striving to 
improve their financial condition. 
Impact on Investors from Decreased Market Making Activity 
The impact of the Volcker Rule will not be limited to banking entities.  Investors will be impacted with a 
meaningful unintended result if the rule is applied too restrictively regarding proprietary trading and 
market making.  Liquidity will leave the markets due to the rule’s lack of clarity. 
FINRA defines itself as an advocate for investors that maintains fair markets and, most importantly 
regarding the Volcker Rule, it proactively addresses “emerging regulatory issues before they harm 
investors or the markets,” (FINRA, 2011).  Thomas Gira, Executive Vice President of the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) is quoted by Mehta (2011) as saying the Volcker Rule has the 
“potential to impact legitimate activity,”  and that what constitutes market making is a “difficult 
question to get your arms around.  From a surveillance standpoint, this is a pretty challenging rule,” 
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(Mehta, 2011).  
Jamie Dimon, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of JPMorgan described the importance of banks 
acting as market makers for investors during a conference call; “The United States has the best, deepest, 
widest, and the most transparent capital markets in the world, which give you, the investor, the ability 
to buy and sell large amounts at very cheap prices.  That’s a good thing.  I wish Paul Volcker understood 
that.”  (Mehta, 2011).   
David A. Viniar, Chief Financial Officer of Goldman Sachs, and James Gorman, Chief Executive Officer of 
Morgan Stanley, are shutting down their proprietary trading divisions in compliance with the rule.  They 
too, are concerned about losing capacity for making markets and warn that if the Volcker Rule is 
interpreted too strictly, banking entities will see their capacity for market making reduced.  The investor 
will ultimately feel the impact when market liquidity is reduced (Brush, Harper, & Moore, 2011). 
Lost Capacity for Banks and Businesses to Compete 
Another unintended result of the proposed rule is how it will decrease competitiveness by all entities 
impacted within its scope.  To begin with, the proposed rule will give the advantage to foreign banks 
that will not have any involvement with United States financial services covered by the rule.  Peter 
Nerby, a Moody’s Investors Service analyst, observes that, “The rule disadvantages the important core 
market-making franchises of the big United States banks and creates opportunities for unregulated 
competitors, such as high-frequency trading firms, and the non-United States operations of foreign 
banks,” (Panchuk, 2011). 
While speaking on a panel hosted by New York University’s Stern School of Business in September, the 
chief executive officer of JPMorgan’s investment bank, James (Jes) Staley commented on the regulators’ 
observance when the Volcker Rule was first introduced.  He said assurances were made that other 
countries “would fall in line, but we haven’t seen that.  Germany, France, China, Brazil.  They didn’t 
follow us,” (Touryalai, Oct 12).   
The rule covers all banking entities that fit the guidelines, whether they are United States owned or 
foreign owned, and its scope continues beyond the shores of the United States.  Landy (2011) 
summarizes how the rule expands its jurisdiction into other countries.  First, to escape impact from the 
rule, no party to a trade may be a United States resident, which includes United States companies.  
Second, no person in the United States may be directly involved in the trade, including employees of 
non-American banks that are operating within the country.   
The third part of Landy’s summary states that to avoid falling under regulation by the Volcker Rule, a 
trade must be “executed wholly” outside of the United States.  No part of a trade may be executed by 
any banking entity, clearinghouse, stock exchange, or any other entity that is a part of the United States 
financial system.  The last point of Landy’s summary is that if the banking entity falls within the scope of 
the rule, every trade must be proven to comply through documenting, reporting, internal controls, and 
certifications.  These restrictions will cause jobs to leave the country as foreign owned banks move their 
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offices and branches out of the United States. 
In addition to causing jobs to leave the United States, competitiveness of United States companies will 
decrease in the global markets due to the higher costs associated with financing.  It can be concluded 
that given the high costs associated with compliance with the Volcker Rule, rather than adding new, 
non-revenue producing jobs to enforce the United States rule, foreign banks may elect to avoid working 
with United States customers.  An example that indicates this conclusion is how difficult it would be for 
European banks to absorb the lost revenues and increased costs from the proposed rule during the 
financial and euro crisis currently taking place in the European Union.   
The competition in the global markets will shift away from United States banking entities and 
customers.  The revenues generated from the transactions will not cover the higher costs, and the 
United States customers – including businesses – will have to pay higher fees.  If enforced, the proposed 
rule will place United States banks as well as United States companies at a distinct disadvantage while 
competing in the global markets. 
Proprietary Traders Exiting Investment Banks 
A consequence of the proposed Volcker Rule is that prop traders are leaving the larger, more regulated 
banking entities to open new hedge funds in smaller, less regulated financial institutions.  Often, they 
are becoming independent wealth managers or moving to private asset managers or insurance 
companies (Major Trends, 2011).   
The Volcker Rule is causing more jobs than those in foreign owned banks and their subsidiaries to leave 
the United States.  Exiting prop traders and hedge fund managers are moving offshore, often to Asia, 
and taking their talents and skills in creating wealth with them.  Those who remain will have the added 
hurdle of competing with the offshore talent in international markets.   
To understand the implications of the relocation of skills and talents, the difference between a prop 
trader and hedge fund manager should be understood.  While both prop traders and hedge fund 
managers are experienced with managing large amounts of capital, a bank prop trader has a different 
focus regarding capital and risk.  Prop traders do not view capital as a tightly fixed amount (Analysis, 
2011). They have an investment “credit line” financed through the bank’s balance sheet.  By contrast, 
private asset managers and independent hedge fund managers are not a division in a larger entity with a 
larger balance sheet.  Their capital is limited to the balance sheet of the assets they manage from day-
to-day. 
The second difference between prop trading and managing a hedge fund is the amount of cash 
maintained (Analysis).  Prop traders can take more risk by working with minimal cash.  Hedge fund 
managers maintain a certain amount of cash in preparation for customer redemptions.  The higher 
percentage of cash balance reduces the amount of risk in the fund. 
The third difference between prop trading and managing a hedge fund is diversification (Analysis).  An 
individual prop trader can specialize in a single type of asset.  Diversification is not a focus for an 
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individual prop trader.  It is established through the combination of the trading activities of the multiple 
prop traders in the banking entity who each specialize their area of asset classes.  By contrast, a hedge 
fund manager is required to provide diversification within the fund.  Diversification within a fund can 
decrease the amount of investible capital that can be used to manage risk while unwinding a position.  
The differences between prop trading and hedge fund management lead to different risk management 
structures.  The example set by MF Global Holdings, Ltd., which  would not have been covered under the 
Volcker Rule, emphasizes the magnitude of the impact of the different risk management techniques that 
can result. 
Following is a summary of events that led up to the filing for bankruptcy by MF Global.  The summary 
provides insight into what can occur when risk is transferred by the Volcker Rule from large banking 
entities that build internal controls to disperse risk, to the more vulnerable segments of the financial 
system that do not have the capacity to control large amounts of risk.  Ultimately, the risk is transferred 
to the investor when losses are incurred from the failure of the smaller financial institution. 
Carney (2011) describes events that lead to MF Global’s filing for bankruptcy.  After constructing what is 
traditionally viewed as a low risk “repo-to-maturity” trade of European debt with capital owned by the 
firm, the risk suddenly increased as the value of the bonds decreased.  A circle of events resulted.   
Regulators required more capital in preparation for probable margin calls, as well as the disclosure of 
the size of position.  After learning the size of position and the higher risk due to the lower value of the 
bonds, ratings agencies issued downgrades of MF Global’s credit, which in turn led to further creditor 
calls for additional collateral.   
 
HEDGE FUNDS 
 
Impact on Private Banking Wealth Management 
In his video produced by Kantola (2008), Jay Conger quoted a person he identified as a private banking 
executive for a large Swiss bank.  The executive positioned the division’s attitude to competition with 
the statement, “You are about to lose every second customer.”  His words show how essential it is to 
compete to gain every new client that has an interest in investment and private banking, and to 
maintain a secure relationship with every one of the division’s established clients. 
In response to the Volcker Rule, Private banking divisions may consider that statement to be more than 
a positioning of attitude.  It may become reality, especially regarding their high net worth clients that 
provide a large percentage of a bank’s private investment capital.  Rather than invest their wealth with 
private banking, they may move it to a private hedge fund, or they may open a family office.  Families 
with $100 million or more have been increasingly trending toward opening independent offices.  The 
lesser known method for managing wealth was first initiated when John D. Rockefeller’s family office 
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was opened in 1882 to manage the family’s assets.  With the introduction of the Volcker Rule, this lesser 
known method is becoming more widely implemented. 
The opening of new hedge funds is a transfer of risk from regulated entities to less regulated entities.  
The new hedge funds are not subject to the more rigorous regulations to which the covered financial 
entities must adhere.  Consequently, instead of investing their wealth in the more regulated 
environment, investors are placing their wealth at a greater risk of loss in an environment that is not 
subject to the same rigor in regulations. 
Herding 
To effectively manage or regulate systemic risk, it is essential to first understand the two channels 
through which the risk can occur.  King and Maier (2007) provide the following analysis of the two 
channels: 
“A direct channel occurs when a collapse of a hedge fund (or group of hedge funds) 
holding large positions leads to forced liquidations of those positions at fire-sale 
prices.  The impact on asset prices may be amplified through the use of leverage – 
whether created directly through the use of margin or indirectly through the 
embedded leverage of derivative positions. Such a disorderly unwinding, it is feared, 
could generate heavy losses to counterparties and ultimately contribute to severe 
financial distress at one or more systematically important financial institutions. 
 
In the indirect channel, a forced hedge fund liquidation exacerbates market 
volatility and reduces liquidity in key markets. Systemic risk can occur when 
correlations in asset classes increase during times of stress, or when the potential 
for herding amplifies market movements.” 
 
King and Maier (2007) caution that systemic risk increases when economies and markets experience 
increased stress.  The correlation between asset classes increases, and hedge fund trades herd together 
- amplifying market movements.  If enough hedge funds unknowingly herd together with a trade that 
makes sense given market conditions, market volatility increases as does the potential for systemic risk 
with increased price movement.  Tail risk events are occurring more frequently, again increasing the 
potential for systemic risk through herding.   
The Volcker Rule does not address the potential for systemic risk from the domino effect of hedge funds 
and broker-dealers.  At first glance, events surrounding MF Global’s implosion potentially support the 
purpose of the rule in that the broker-dealer’s demise did not threatened the entire financial system.  
However, as more independent hedge funds open due to the exit of traders and managers from the 
banking entities covered by the Volcker Rule, the phenomenon of herding should be taken into 
consideration.  When herding occurs, the sum of the parts can add up to a systemically meaningful 
whole. 
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Risk Transferred to the Vulnerable 
 
One of the effects of the Volcker Rule prohibiting banking entities from owning more than three percent 
in a hedge fund or private equity fund is to ultimately transfer the risk from the financial sector to an 
already vulnerable segment of the population, the current and future retirees through pension funds. 
There is a large dislocation in funding of pension funds that is driving the funds to increase investment in 
hedge funds to capture the absolute returns.  In the White Paper, “Major Trends Occurring in 2011: 
Implications for Hedge Funds / Funds of Funds,” Infovest 21 (2011) writes about the increasing demand 
by pension funds that are underfunded.  At year-end 2010, Standard & Poor’s estimated the amount of 
combined underfunding to be $315 billion for 1500 of the largest United States pension funds.  In 2010, 
corporate pension funds were funded at average to 81 percent, and state and local funds were funded 
at average to only 79 percent.  Infovest21 further defined the lack of performance in pension funds that 
invested in the S&P 500, which had a return of only 0.4 percent during the ten years from 2000 to 2010.   
With the Volcker Rule prohibiting prop trading and more than three percent ownership in hedge funds, 
the best and the brightest traders and managers are exiting the banks to manage hedge funds 
independently or within financial entities not covered by the rule.  They will not be met with the 
regulatory concerns arising from the Volcker Rule, including limits on compensation (Major Trends, 
2011).   There are two issues that arise from the relocation of talent.   
The first issue is that many of the skilled and talented prop traders do not have experience with running 
a business.  The business activities that were segregated into separate departments of the bank 
suddenly become a part of the traders’ daily schedule when running a hedge fund outside of the 
banking entity (Major Trends). Higher costs are associated with the administrative duties of a hedge 
fund office.  Commentary from a law firm in the “Major Trends Occurring in 2011” White Paper by 
Infovest21 provides perspective on the different requirements of a hedge fund that is managed outside 
of a banking entity.  The law firm recommends: 
“that managers adopt articulate FCPA (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977) 
compliance policies and procedures, establish oversight by senior executives with 
responsibility for compliance policy implementation and review, require annual 
certification and regular training, establish procedures for entering into a third party 
business relationship, create a reporting system to ensure that violations can be 
promptly detected and remedied, set up accounting procedures and controls to 
ensure accurate accounting and books and records, and have independent audits 
conducted.” 
The broker-dealer MF Global provides an example of what can happen when accounting books and 
records are not accurate.  Inaccurate accounting methods brought negotiations for a merger with other 
broker-dealers to a halt.  MF Global was rapidly searching for a buyer with a larger balance sheet that 
could absorb the risk; however, each broker-dealer considering the merger stated they backed away 
after analyzing the books.  The statement was made by one broker-dealer that it could not “get a good 
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sense of what was on the balance sheet,” (Lucchetti & Patterson, 2011).   
The only action left for MF Global was to file for bankruptcy.  The events surrounding the filing support 
the statement made by Pirrong, a finance professor specializing in risk management at the University of 
Houston.  Mehta (2011) quotes Pirrong; “You think you’re reducing risk but you’re shifting it around in 
ways that can come back and bite you.  Customers will go to other financial entities. (The Volcker Rule) 
doesn’t make the problems go away.  It just changes the location.”  When herding is taken into 
consideration, Pirrong’s statement regarding the shifting of risk becomes even more deeply concerning. 
At the time of the writing of this paper, $600 million of MF Global’s customer money cannot be found.  
In the article written by Lucchetti and Patterson (2011), a regulator with the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) stated that ten days out from the initial bankruptcy filing, the numbers are not 
leading the regulators to the customers’ money due to the condition of the accounting books.     
Prior to the Volcker Rule, concern over customer money prompted some banking entities to construct a 
“fund of one,” (Major Trends, 2011).  In response to the fraud from Madoff, private wealth divisions 
were increasing their due diligence teams and creating new products.  The fund of one was a new 
product that was constructed with the investment from a single customer.  The customer might be an 
individual, a pension fund, or another type of investor.  A feature of the fund of one is that it eliminates 
the opportunity for the Ponzi scheme fraud committed by Madoff.   
There are hurdles for smaller financial institutions that would consider offering the financial product.  A 
fund of one can be cost prohibitive with the extra accounting, compliance and administration required, 
which makes it less attractive to hedge fund managers outside of investment banks.  Another hurdle is 
the management of risk within the fund.  Prop traders and fund managers are talented and skilled in 
their areas of specialization; however, their risk management skills were sharpened with a balance sheet 
that could absorb a greater amount of risk.   
With its ties to Goldman Sachs talent, MF Global is an example of the difference in risk management 
techniques of a more constrained, broker-dealer balance sheet as compared to the larger investment 
bank balance sheet of Goldman Sachs.  The relatively conservative risk management technique that 
matched the smaller MF Global balance sheet was ratcheted up by talent learned at the Goldman Sachs 
investment bank.  A higher tolerance for risk had been learned while working with a much larger 
balance sheet (Brush, Harper & Moore, 2011).  The trade that had been thought to involve low risk 
suddenly altered into a trade that involved too much risk for the smaller balance sheet of the broker-
dealer.  Where MF Global declared bankruptcy, Goldman Sachs more than likely would have had the 
capacity to manage the risk through additional hedging while unwinding the position. 
Smaller banking entities with smaller balance sheets, as well as retirees, are more susceptible to risk.  
The Oregon public pension fund was invested in a fund that had been built to $7 billion and then used to 
invest in MF Global.  The fund is down 60 percent (Erman, 2011).   
When pension funds could invest in hedge funds managed by banks, they had the additional assurance 
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of the bank performing due diligence to decrease the likelihood of fraud.  With the prohibition in the 
Volcker Rule, pension funds along with all other investors in hedge funds, will have to rely solely on their 
independent due diligence while researching the fund manager’s competency and legitimacy.  With the 
trading strategies that are unique to hedge funds, the funds are not readily transparent, causing both 
competency and legitimacy to be difficult to determine. 
Self-Imposed Reduction of Risk 
The financial system has been actively working to reduce the amount of systemic risk since 2007.  Tim 
Ryan, President and Chief Executive Officer of Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 
(SIFMA) included the following quote in his opening remarks for the annual SIFMA meeting held 
November 7, 2011: 
 “Since the end of 2007, U.S. financial firms have raised more than $300 
billion of common equity. The largest U.S. banks have reduced their average 
leverage ratio from 16:1 to 11:1 and increased loan loss reserves by about 200%. 
Off-balance sheet activity has also been reduced dramatically. Many have already 
undergone stress tests with both the Treasury and Fed. Over 90 percent of the TARP 
capital infusion funds into banks have already been repaid, with interest, dividend 
and warrant sales for a profit of $19 billion to the taxpayers to date.” 
 “At SIFMA, we have been focused from the very early days of regulatory 
reform on being productive participants in the process. Through our committees, on 
which almost 6,000 members from the industry participate, we provide information 
and analysis to help the regulators craft rules that work and create certainty. We 
support measures to restore faith and confidence in our financial system, such as 
establishing a systemic risk regulator and the designation of bank and non-bank 
firms as systemically important. We believe there should be a uniform fiduciary 
standard of care. We support risk retention and other improvements in the 
securitization space to help jumpstart recovery of the housing market. But we 
cannot support measures which disrupt market functions or increase systemic risk, 
ultimately failing to achieve what Congress and the Administration sought to 
accomplish with this legislation.” 
Capitalism is strengthened by competition and sustainability.  If a business practice does not support the 
company’s sustainability, the company will take action to correct the practice.  The financial industry is 
implementing the changed practices as noted in Tim Ryan’s statement to decrease systemic risk.  This 
will increase the sustainability of banking entities and of the financial system. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Intended results of the proposed Volcker Rule are to reduce risk of lost investor deposits and to reduce 
systemic risk in the financial system.  However, the magnitude of the impact caused by the unintended 
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results may derail the intended results. 
In its current form, the proposed rule lacks clarity between prohibited proprietary trading and allowed 
market making activities.  As covered banking entities end prop trading, they may also decrease market 
making due to a lack of clear definition.  The result will be less liquidity in the markets, causing less 
efficiency and increasing costs for investors.   
Further effects of the proposed Volcker Rule are to lose jobs in the United States and to decrease 
revenue while also markedly increasing costs of compliance for banks.   These events are occurring at a 
time when the banking entities are recovering from the recent financial crisis, and when economic 
recovery has been slow. 
The increase in required bureaucracy and the high costs associated with compliance with the Volcker 
Rule have the potential to cause foreign banks to cease conducting business within the United States 
and to avoid working with United States customers.  Either the revenues generated from the 
transactions will not cover the costs and the associated bureaucracy, or the United States customer will 
pay substantially higher costs for the financial service.  If enforced, the proposed rule will place United 
States banks as well as United States companies at a disadvantage while competing in the global 
markets. 
Investment by banking entities covered by the proposed Volcker Rule in hedge funds and private equity 
funds is limited to 3 percent.  Risk is transferring from regulated banking entities to less regulated asset 
managers and insurance companies.  Prop traders are exiting investment banks to open new hedge 
funds, and banking entities are exiting their prohibited ownership or relationships with hedge funds.   
Pension funds that are underfunded are increasingly searching for absolute returns generated by hedge 
funds and returns from private equity funds.  The unintended result of reducing systemic risk in banking 
entities will be the transfer of risk to relatively unregulated financial asset management entities and the 
vulnerable current and future retirees through underfunded pension funds. 
In divergence from the Volcker Rule, rather than prohibit prop trading, banks should be regulated to 
limit prop trading to tier one capital.  Two objectives would be met with the implementation of this type 
of regulation.  Customer deposits would be protected from prop trading activities, and banks would not 
be unduly concerned about how the regulatory agencies would interpret their market making activities.  
Market liquidity would not be negatively impacted by regulation.  Investors would benefit through a 
more competitive investment environment that would maintain market liquidity. 
Rather than severely limit regulated banking entity ownership or relationships with hedge funds and 
private equity funds, systemic risk can be reduced by lowering the amount of leverage allowed to 
generate the absolute return.  The future and current retirees depending on pension funds will benefit 
from the increased competition between banking entities within an investment environment that is 
more carefully regulated. 
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Davis Polk & Wardwell Law Firm, LLP.  (2011, Oct 12).  Volcker Rule Proposed Regulations: Proprietary Trading. 
Retrieved from http://www.volckerrule.com/proprietary/prop.htm. Link: 2a. Market Making vs. Proprietary 
Trading. 
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